ABSTRACT The advantages of cloud storage make more and more tenants outsource their data to the cloud. In the vehicular ad hoc networks, the sensors on the vehicle can collect road information being available for analyzing traffic conditions and their integrity must be guaranteed. Due to the limited storage capability, the vehicles tend to store the valid information have been collected on the cloud servers. However, unlike using local storage devices, the vehicles no longer have absolute control over the cloud data. Clearly, as the tenants of the cloud storage, the vehicles are most concerned about the data integrity. It is a pity that many existing integrity auditing schemes have some shortcomings, such as low efficiency in data dynamic updating, leakage of data privacy, and high auditing cost. To solve these problems, this paper proposes a dynamic data integrity auditing scheme supporting data privacy protection. First, build the hierarchical multiple branches tree data authentication structure in the initialization phase. Second, design a data integrity auditing scheme based on the bilinear pairing mapping technology and the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham digital signature mechanism, and describe the process of data dynamic updating in detail. Finally, security analysis and performance analysis are carried out in the evaluation of the scheme. The security analysis shows that the scheme can satisfy auditing correctness, support data privacy protection, resist forgery attack, and replay attack. The performance analysis shows that, compared with the existing scheme, the scheme reduces the time cost of data integrity auditing and dynamic updating.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing [1] , [2] is a new generation of network business computing model based on network technology, virtualization technology and distributed computing technology, with the characteristics of dynamic expansion, resource sharing and broadband access. The cloud computing technology effectively aggregates virtualized hardware and software resources over a network, providing the tenant with different computing storage services. The tenant can obtain computing and storage resources at a relatively inexpensive price and in a convenient way through remote resource access [3] . In addition, the network service providers can handle tens of millions or even millions of information in seconds with the help of cloud computing technology, achieving the same powerful network services as using ''supercomputers''.
Cloud storage [4] , [5] is a new concept extending and developing based on cloud computing. It is a storage pool system that aggregates all kinds of storage devices through cluster applications, distributed computing and distributed file system, which provides data storage and services access to tenants by the application interfaces. More and more tenants (including individuals, businesses, government departments, etc.) are also receiving great changes in cloud storage while paying attention to its service applications [6] . With the development of network technology and the expansion of the demand for IT resources, more and more businesses and individuals want to outsource a large amount of data to the cloud for computing and storage for the purpose of reducing the cost of infrastructure.
At the same time, the rapid development of sensors and wireless network has promoted the emergence of VANETs, allowing vehicles to collect and process information [7] . In VANETs, the vehicles are equipped with a variety of sensing devices (e.g., camera, Global Positioning System), so the vehicles can constantly collect the traffic information, such as the congested roads, road videos and sounds. And all the traffic information is communicated via a wireless communication channel. Document [8] introduces a novel heuristic so as to increase the communication efficiency. In fact, the information collected by the vehicles needs to be completely stored, because the complete road information has a very high value of use. For example, when a traffic accident occurs, both parties usually think that the error comes from the other party and therefore a dispute arises. Without an adequate evidence, the policeman can hardly make accurate judgments. In this case, the complete road videos collected by multiple vehicles from different angles will help the police make a correct division of responsibility. Additionally, by systematically analyzing numerous road traffic information collected by vehicles, the relevant government departments can make a better plan of road construction, helpful in reducing congestion and improving the travel experience.
Unfortunately, the computation and storage capability of vehicles is limited. It is unrealistic to store all the information collected by vehicles locally. Therefore, it is a good choice to combine the VANET with cloud storage. Under this setting, the vehicles being the tenants of cloud can reduce the storage burden of vehicles and facilitate the third party use of data (e.g. Roads and Traffic Authority) by outsourcing the information to the cloud servers. In fact, it is not a fresh idea to combine VANETs with other technology. In document [9] , fog computing has been merged with VANETs to guarantee low latency.
However, the cloud tenants will lose their full control over the data because of outsourcing the data, which brings new challenges to the cloud computing and the data security [10] . On the one hand, the cloud service provider is unreliable, and for their own economic benefits, it may deliberately delete part of the tenant's data. On the other hand, failures of hardware and software will inevitably lead to data corruption. In addition, the data may also be subject to other external attacks. However, the cloud service provider may sometimes hide these errors and make the tenants believe that the data is still stored correctly on the cloud servers [11] , [12] . If the vehicles access the VANETs through a well-designed service access system, the road safety and driving experience will be increased significantly [13] . Integrity is especially important for the data collected by vehicles and incomplete information may lead to wrong judgments. To ensure the correctness of the data stored on the cloud servers, the data integrity auditing must be carried out periodically to ensure that the data storage is safe and correct [14] .
In order to protect the data integrity, document [15] - [26] put forward a variety of auditing schemes and protocols, generally divided into PDP model and POR model. Document [15] - [20] are only applicable to static auditing without taking into account the tenant's need for data dynamic updating. In support of data dynamic updating, the document [21] , [27] - [30] propose some new integrity auditing schemes, where both [21] and [29] support the data dynamic operations by building Merkle Hash Tree (MHT). In order to reduce the calculation burden of the tenant and support the public auditing, the third-party auditor is allowed to perform the data integrity auditing in the document [21] - [26] . However, a new problem will arise after the introduction of the third party auditor. In the process of data integrity auditing, the third-party auditor may obtain the data privacy of tenants.
The data transmission and storage in VANETs are attractive research topics in both academic and industrial circles, and pioneers have done a lot of fruitful work in data transmission [31] , [32] . In terms of data storage, the limited local storage resources of vehicles inspired researchers to use cloud storage technology. In view of the data security threats faced by the tenant after the introduction of third-party audit in the data integrity auditing scheme and the low efficiency of the dynamic updating, this paper proposes a new data integrity auditing scheme based on the data coloring privacy protection method [33] , HMBT data authentication structure, bilinear pairing mapping technique [34] and the BLS Signature Scheme [35] . Specifically, the main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) This paper divides the coloring data into twodimensional structures, and further constructs the HMBT as a storage authentication structure to support the more granular data dynamic operations. 2) This paper proposes a data integrity auditing scheme based on bilinear pairing mapping and BLS signature scheme to ensure that a third-party auditor cannot steal data privacy during the process of data integrity auditing. 3) This paper proves the security of the scheme and compares it with the existing scheme to verify it's efficiency. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the system model, security model and design goals. In Section 3, we propose an efficient and safe auditing scheme and describe in detail the process of data dynamic operations. In Section 4, we carry out the security analysis to verify the performance from the aspect of auditing efficiency and dynamic updating efficiency. In Section 5, we present the related work of auditing scheme. Finally, we draw the conclusion in Section 6.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, we describe the system model, security model and design goals of this scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider an auditing scheme for cloud storage involving three different entities, as illustrated in Figure 1 : 1) Tenant: Also called data owner, is a vehicle that is equipped with a variety of sensing devices and needs to outsource the collected data to cloud storage servers provided by the cloud service provider. 2) Cloud Service Provider (CSP): CSP can provide large amounts of computing resources, storage resources and network resources for the tenant. 3) Third Party Auditor (TPA): TPA possesses professional data integrity auditing knowledge, shares a group of decryption keys with the tenant. After being authorized by the tenant, it can challenge the cloud service provider to complete data integrity auditing.
B. SECURITY MODEL
At present, many vehicles choose to become tenants of the cloud and outsource their collected data to the cloud servers to reduce the burden on the storage and maintenance of local data. However, because the vehicles no longer have absolute control over their data, the problem of data security cannot be ignored. In order to determine the data integrity, it is necessary to periodically perform data integrity auditing to ensure that the outsourced data storage is safe and correct. For the problem of data integrity auditing, the security threats faced by tenants in this paper are:
1) Malicious cloud service provider may not store the data in accordance with the agreement because of economic interests. When data integrity is compromised, the homomorphism of data tags is used to forge a new tag to deceive tenant. In addition, the cloud service provider may not honestly update the tenant's data, but use the old data and tags to deceive the tenant. Even if the cloud service provider has faithfully stored the tenant's data, it will inevitably cause hardware and software failures, resulting in data corruption. 2) Generally, the tenant's computing resources and computing power are often limited, so third party auditor is introduced into many data integrity auditing schemes, and tenant delegates auditing tasks to the third party auditor. Although the introduction of the third party auditor alleviates the burden of the tenant to some extent, the third party auditor may steal the data information for some purposes in the process of auditing, causing a new threat to the tenant's data privacy. In addition, the tenant needs to dynamically update the outsourced data. Therefore, in considering the above security threats, the data integrity auditing scheme must also be able to support tenant to dynamically update data.
C. DESIGN GOALS
In order not to threaten the tenant's data privacy in the process of data integrity auditing and to satisfy the tenant's need for dynamically updating the data, our design goals can be summarized as follows: 1) Correctness: Cloud service providers can only pass data integrity auditing if they have stored data completely. 2) Public auditing: Third party auditor can perform integrity auditing on outsourced data without knowing the private key. 3) Resist forgery attack: Cloud service provider cannot fake data tags based on existing data and tags to deceive auditor. 4) Resist replay attack: When the tenant sends a request for updating data, the cloud service provider must honestly perform the corresponding updating, otherwise, it cannot pass the verification. 5) Data privacy protection: During the process of data integrity auditing, the third party auditor cannot steal data privacy based on evidence information.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we build the data integrity auditing algorithms and describe in detail the process of data dynamic updating.
A. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Bilinear Map: A bilinear map is a map e : G 1 xG 2 → G T . G 1 , G 2 , where G 1 , G 2 and G T are cyclic multiplication groups with a prime order a, the generators of G 1 and G 2 are u and v respectively. H (·) : {0, 1} * → G 1 is a safe hash function that is mapped to a point, which maps a binary string to a multiplicative cyclic group G 1 . h (·) : G T → Z a is a safe hash function that maps the group elements of G T to Z a .
Multiple Branches Tree: A Multiple Branches Tree (MBT) is an n-tree authentication structure. Except for leaf nodes, each node has p child nodes and has only one parent node but multiple sibling nodes.
B. CONSTRUCTION OF SCHEME 1) DESIGN OF SCHEME
This polynomial algorithm is run by the tenant, and the security parameter 1 k is used as input to export the public key p k and private key s k required for the process of data integrity auditing.
is run by the tenant. Input private key s k and coloring data file F, then output data block tag set ϕ and signature Sig s k (H (R)) of HMBT's root node. 3) GenProof (F, ϕ, challenge) → {P}. This algorithm is run by the cloud service provider. The input is data F, tag set ϕ and challenge information (sent by the tenant or TPA to the CSP), which outputs evidence P. The auditor uses evidence P to illustrate the data integrity. 4) CheckProof(p k , challenge, P) → {1, 0}. This algorithm can be run by the third party auditor or tenant. When the third party auditor or tenant receives the auditing evidence P, the public key p k , the challenge information and the evidence P are used as the input of the algorithm, and the output is 1, which means that the data is still correctly stored in the cloud, and 0 means that the data integrity has been destroyed. 5) PrepareUpdate(F, ϕ) → (Update). This algorithm is run by the tenant to perform updating operations on outsourced data files. Input the data to be modified and the corresponding tags, and the output is request message Update. Finally, the tenant sends the request message to the cloud service provider. 6) ExecUpdate(F, ϕ, Update) → (F , φ , P update ). This algorithm is run by the cloud service provider. Input the data file F, corresponding tag set ϕ, and updating request message Update. Then output the updated data F , tag set φ , and proof P update of updating operation.
This algorithm is run by the tenant. Input the public key p k , updating request information Update, and the updated evidence P update . Then the output is 1, which means that the cloud service provider has correctly updated the data, and 0 means that the cloud service provider does not have correctly updated the data.
C. CONSTRUCTION OF HMBT
As the vehicle is constantly collecting data, the data outsourced to the cloud server also needs to be dynamically updated. In order to enable the tenant to dynamically update data with different granularity, this paper constructs the HMBT authentication structure. The specific process is as follows:
1) The tenant divides the coloring data into the twodimensional structure:
2) Introduce a one-dimensional vector: is verified by the HMBT authentication structure, as shown in Figure 3 . The leaf node value of HMBT is H(Z i ), and the values of other nodes are the connections of all hash values of their child nodes.
From the above construction process, we can see that the data file is reorganized into a two-dimensional structure, storing and auditing with hierarchical MBT structure. Compared with the hierarchical index authentication structure in [25] , the height of the HMBT authentication structure tree introduced by this scheme is significantly reduced, which effectively reduces the calculation burden of tenant and cloud service provider. Therefore it can improve the efficiency of constructing and querying the authentication structure in the process of dynamic auditing, which can not only achieve the purpose of supporting the dynamic updating operations with different granularity, but also improve the efficiency of the data integrity auditing.
1) DATA INTEGRITY AUDITING SCHEME
After constructing the HMBT authentication structure, this paper further constructs a data integrity auditing scheme. The tenant of the scheme first performs preprocessing and stores the preprocessed data in the cloud. Afterward, the tenant or third party auditor sends an integrity auditing challenge to the cloud service provider.
Data preprocessing stage: At this stage, tenants run KeyGen(·) algorithm and TagGen(·) algorithm to preprocess the data and build the HMBT data authentication structure, signing the root node of the HMBT. The block set, tag set, and signatures of the HMBT root node are sent to the cloud service provider and finally the local data is deleted. The specific process is as follows:
1) The tenant runs the KeyGen(·) algorithm. Select random elements l ∈ Z a and x ∈ G 1 and calculate y = v l , v is the generator of the group G 2 , then the private key is s k = (l), the public key is p k = (y, v, x, e(x, y)).
2) The tenant runs the TagGen(·) algorithm. Divide the coloring data file into a two-dimensional structure:
Construct a one-dimensional vector
then use the BLS signature scheme to create tag ϕ ij for each basic block b ij , i = 1, 2, · · · , m, j = 1, 2, · · · , n:
The tag set is:
Then the tenant constructs the HMBT authentication structure. As shown in Figure 3 , the leaf node of the authentication tree corresponds to H (Z i ) , (i = 1, 2, · · · , m), and the root node R is signed with a private key, obtaining Sig s k (H (R)) = (H (R)) l , where the Sig(·) is a secure BLS digital signature scheme. Finally, the tenant sends the block set F, tag set ϕ, and the signature Sig s k (H (R)) together to the cloud service provider, and deletes the local data F, tag ϕ, and Sig s k (H (R)). After the cloud service provider receives the data information sent by the tenant, it will store the data on the cloud servers and construct the same HMBT authentication structure. Auditing Stage: At this stage, the tenant or the third party auditor randomly selects the data blocks index needing to be audited to generate the challenge information and sends it to the cloud service provider. After receiving the challenge, the cloud service provider runs the GenProof (•) algorithm to generate corresponding auditing evidence and returns it to the tenant or third party auditor. Finally, the tenant or the third party auditor runs CheckProof (•) algorithm to judge the correctness of the evidence and determine the integrity of outsourced data. This stage is completed in three parts. The following assumes that the third party auditor performs data integrity auditing. The process of data integrity auditing is shown in Figure4. Specific Process: 1) Challenge: In order to generate challenge information challenge, the third party auditor randomly selects d elements from {1, m} to form a set
, and selects random element π i ∈ Z a for each i ∈ D to generate the challenge information challenge =
Finally, third party auditor sends the challenge to cloud service provider. 2) Response: After the cloud service provider receives the challenge message challenge = {(i,π i )} r 1 ≤i≤r d , the response evidence is generated by running the GenProof(·) algorithm. Firstly, the cloud service provides uses the pseudo-random function f π i (·) to compute a random coefficient ε ij = f π i (j) for each b ij , where i ∈ D, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, and calculates µ and σ , as show in Equation (1) and (2) .
Secondly, the cloud service provider provides the auxiliary validation information { } i∈D corresponding to the i-th leaf node H(Z i ) of HMBT authentication structure and signature Sig s k (H (R)) of the root node, then the response evidence P is shown in Equation (3).
Finally, the cloud service provider sends P to the third party auditor. 3) Audit: After the third party auditor receives the evidence P, the third party auditor runs the CheckProof(·) algorithm to verify evidence P. Firstly, the root node R is generated using H(Z i ), i , and the validity of R is verified by Equation (4).
If the Equation (4) does not hold, there is no need for further verification, otherwise, the verification of the Equation (5) is continued.
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2) SUPPORT FOR DATA DYNAMICS
The tenant in this scheme can perform modification, insertion and deletion of their outsourced data. Firstly, the tenant generates a dynamically updating request message and sends it to the cloud service provider by running PrepareUpdate(·) algorithm. After receiving the request message, the cloud service provider runs ExecUpdate(·) algorithm, outputs the updating evidence after the execution, and returns it to the tenant. Finally, the tenant runs the VerifUpdate (·) algorithm to verify the updating evidence and confirm whether the cloud service provider has honestly performed the corresponding updating operation. The validation passes indicate that the cloud service provider has correctly updated the data, and the tenant will delete the local data. The program can support two kinds of granular dynamic operations, namely coarsegrained operations and fine-grained operations. Fine-grained operations include inserting basic blocks, modifying basic blocks, and deleting basic blocks. Coarse-grained operations include inserting data blocks and deleting data blocks. 1) Fine-grained operations Since modifying and deleting basic blocks is basically similar to inserting basic blocks, the insertion process is highlighted below.
Assume that the tenant needs to insert a new basic block b ij behind the j basic block b ij in the block B i . The specific operation is as follows:
1) Perform the PrepareUpdate(·) algorithm to generate a request message for inserting a basic block. Firstly, the tenant generates a corresponding authentication tag φ ij for the basic block b ij . Secondly, the tenant generates a request message Update I = {Insert, i, j, b ij , φ ij }. Finally, the Update I is sent to the cloud service provider. 2) When the cloud service provider receives the request message for inserting the basic block, it performs the ExecUpdate(·) algorithm to insert the basic block b ij and output a new data file F , tag set φ and evidence P Insert . Specifically, firstly, the cloud service provider stores the basic block b ij on the servers, generates an auxiliary validation path i of the leaf node H(Z i ), and outputs a new data file F . Secondly, insert the tag φ ij behind φ ij , outputting a new tag set φ . Thirdly, update HMBT authentication structure, as shown in Figure 5 . Insert the hash value H b ij of the basic block b ij behind th j-th element in the vector Z i , and the inserted vector is recorded as Z i . Then recalculate the value of all nodes on the auxiliary verification path of old leaf node H(Z i ) to generate a new root node R . Finally, generate the evidence P Insert for inserting the basic block operation, as shown in Equation (6) .
Then return the evidence P Insert to the tenant. 3) After the tenant receives the evidence for inserting the basic block returned by the cloud service provider, it will run the VerifUpdate(·) algorithm to verify the evidence. Specifically, the tenant generates a root node R with H(Z i ), i , and uses Equation (7) to verify the validity of the root node R.
If the above Equation (7) 2) Coarse-grained operations Inserting the data block: Suppose the tenant needs to insert a new data block B i behind the i-th data block B i . The specific process is as follows:
1) Perform the PrepareUpdate (·) algorithm to generate a request message for inserting a data block. Firstly, the tenant divides the data block B i into n basic blocks
and generates the corresponding tag set φ i for the data block B i . Finally, the tenant generates a request message Update I = {Insert, i,B i , φ i } and sends it to the cloud service provider. 2) When the cloud service provider receives the request message for inserting the data block, it will perform the ExecUpdate(•) algorithm to insert the data block B i and output the new data file F , tag set φ and evidence P Insert . Specifically, firstly, the cloud service provider first stores the basic blocks b ij of the data block B i on the servers, generates an auxiliary validation path i of the leaf node H(Z i ), and outputs a new data file F . Secondly, insert the tag φ i behind φ i , outputting a new tag set φ . Thirdly, update HMBT authentication structure, as shown in Figure 6 . Change the old stored leaf node H (Z i ) to parent node A, then change H (Z i ) and H(Z I ) to be the child nodes of parent node A. Next, recalculate the value of node A as H (H (Z i ) H(Z I ) ), and continue to recalculate the value of all nodes on the auxiliary verification path of old leaf node H(Z i ) to generate a new root node R . Finally, generate the evidence P Insert for inserting the data block operation, as shown in Equation (8) .
Then return the evidence P Insert to the tenant. a) After the tenant receives the evidence for inserting the data block returned by the cloud service provider, it runs the VerifUpdate(·) algorithm to verify the evidence. Specifically, the tenant generates a root node R with {H(Z i ), i }, and uses Equation (7) to verify the validity of the root node R. If the above Equation (7) The operation of deleting data block is the opposite of inserting data block. There is no need to generate and store the information of new data and tag. The updating of HMBT authentication structure is shown in Figure 7 .
IV. EVALUATION OF SCHEME A. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS
When the cloud service provider correctly stores the data, the third party auditor can correctly verify the evidence P returned by the cloud service provider:
The specific proof process is as follows:
1) It is proved that {µ, σ } is correct. Prove the correctness of Equation (5) with the properties of the bilinear pair. The above proof process shows that the µ, σ } in evidence P is correct.
2) It is proved that H (Z
According to the above detailed description of the HMBT authentication structure, it is easy to get root node R with {H(Z i ), { } i∈D }, and Sig sk (H (R)) = (H (R)) l , then calculate.e(Sig s k (H (R)) , v) = e(H (R) l , v). Based on the properties of bilinear pairing, we obtain e(Sig
From (1) and (2), we know that when the cloud service provider correctly stores the data, the third party auditor can correctly verify the evidence returned by the cloud service provider.
2) DATA PRIVACY PRESERVING ANALYSIS
Theorem: In this scheme, the evidence that the third party auditor receives the return of the cloud service provider is P = {µ, σ, H(Z i ), { } i∈D , Sig s k (H (R))}, In the process of verifying P, the original data of the tenant can't be obtained.
1) It is proved that the third party auditor can't steal the original data of tenant from µ = r d i=r 1 n j=1 ε ij b ij . The data returned by the cloud service provider to the third party auditor is the data colored by the data coloring method in the second chapter. The data coloring method is an irreversible process, and the original real data can't be rebuilt by stealing the coloring data sets. Therefore, the third party auditor can't steal the original data during the process of data integrity auditing.
2) It is proved that the third party auditor can't steal the original data of tenants from σ =
The derivation process shows that x µ is hidden in (
The process of third party auditor calculates (
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem, so the third party auditor can't get x µ , and will not get µ. That is, the data before coloring will not be obtained. Therefore, the third party auditor can't steal the original data during the process of data integrity auditing. It is known from (1) and (2) that in this scheme, the third party auditor can't obtain the original data of the tenant in the process of verifying the evidence, so it can achieve the purpose of data privacy protection.
3) FORGE ATTACK ANALYSIS
Because of economic benefits, the cloud service provider may forge new tags based on the homomorphism of tags, responding to the data integrity challenge initiated by third party auditor. For this forgery attack, after the third party auditor receives the response evidence returned by the cloud service provider, the challenged data information and the corresponding tag index information is verified in this scheme, and the BLS digital signature is adopted when generating data tags. According to the security of the BLS digital signature scheme and the unidirectional nature of the hash function, it can be seen that the method of forging tags cannot pass the auditing of third party auditor. Therefore, this scheme can resist forgery attack.
4) REPLAY ATTACK ANALYSIS
When the tenant needs to update the data, the cloud service provider should update the data and tag information according to the tenant's requirements. However, because of economic benefits or other reasons, the cloud service provider may not perform the updating operations. In this case, the cloud service provider may use the old data and tag information to generate updated evidence to deceive the tenant. In order to resist the replay attack, the third party auditor can generate the root node of the HMBT authentication structure based on the old data and the corresponding auxiliary authentication information in the process of auditing, and then verify the validity of the root node. If the validation is passed, then it continues to generate the new root node based on the updated data and auxiliary verification information, and compare the new root node with the root node returned by the cloud service provider. If the two nodes are the same, it indicates that the leaf nodes of the HMBT authentication structure have been updated accordingly. That is, the cloud service provider updates the data according to the needs of the tenants. In addition, the characteristics of the hash function and data signature make cloud service providers unable to pass auditing if they use old data. Therefore, this scheme can resist such replay attack.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In order to further verify the performance of this method, all the experiments are tested using a Linux system with an Intel Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU running at 2.60 GHz and 16GB RAM, and all algorithms are implemented using C++ language. Our code uses the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library and the crypto library of Open SSL version. Accordingly, to achieve 80-bit security parameter, the curve group we work on has a 160-bit group order. Because the process of constructing the authentication structure of this scheme is similar to [25] (the method of [25] is represented by DPDP), and both support fine-grained dynamic updating operations, the comparison of the experimental performance of this scheme and DPDP is carried out.
1) CONSTRUCTION TIME OF AUTHENTICATION STRUCTURE
This experiment is designed to analyze the time required for tenants and cloud service providers to construct HMBT authentication structure. In the same experimental environment, the time consumed by the two schemes to construct the authentication structure is tested separately. By comparing and analyzing the time, it is verified that this scheme can reduce the computational burden on tenant and cloud service provider. The dataset in the experiment is derived from the public Forest Cover Type Database dataset provided by the UCI artificial intelligence and data mining lab. Select a data set with a size of 256 MB as the input. The size of the partitioned data block is 50 KB, and the size of the basic block is 1 KB. Test the time consumed by tenant and cloud service provider when the output of HMBT authentication structure is 2, 4, 6, 8, 16, 32, and 64. Finally, the average of 20 experiments is selected as the experimental result, as shown in Fig 8. When the output is 2, the non-leaf node has two child nodes. The authentication structure is the hierarchical index structure of [25] ; when the output is greater than 2, non-leaf nodes have n (n>2) child nodes, the authentication structure is the hierarchical index structure of this scheme. It can be seen from Figure 8 that the time when the output is greater than 2 is far less than 2.In other words, the time consumed by the HMBT authentication structure of this scheme is much less than that of the hierarchical index structure of [25] . In addition, with a gradual increase of output, the time in constructing an HMBT authentication structure also gradually decreases. Therefore, the HMBT authentication structure of this scheme can greatly reduce the computational burden on tenant and cloud service provider, thereby improving the efficiency of the entire data integrity auditing system.
2) AUDITING EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
This experiment is designed to analyze and compare the data integrity auditing efficiency of this scheme and [25] . The data integrity auditing efficiency includes two kinds of auditing time and communication cost. In the same experimental environment, test the time and communication cost when two schemes challenge different numbers of data blocks. The auditing time consists of the time consumed by the cloud service provider in generating the verification evidence and the third party auditor in verifying the evidence. The communication cost includes the communication cost of the third party auditor sending challenge information and the cloud service provider's return of verification evidence. The performance of this scheme in terms of auditing efficiency is verified by comparing the auditing time and communication cost.
The data block size divided in the experiment is still 50 KB, and the output of HMBT is 8. The auditing time and communication cost are respectively tested when the number of challenge data blocks are 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, and 300. Finally, the average of 20 experiments is selected as the experimental result, as shown in Fig 9 .
From Figure (a) , it can be seen that when the number of challenged data blocks increases, the auditing time of this scheme and [25] will gradually increase. However, the time of this scheme is less than [25] . This is because this scheme is superior to the [25] in querying and constructing the authentication structure, so the time for the cloud service provider to generate evidence and the third party auditor to verify VOLUME 6, 2018 evidence is reduced. Therefore, the time spent in the process of data integrity auditing of this scheme is less than the [25] .
From Figure (a) , it can be seen that when the number of challenged data blocks increases, the communication cost of this scheme and [25] gradually increases. However, the communication cost of this scheme is larger than [25] . This is because the communication cost of the data integrity auditing includes the communication cost for sending the challenged data block and returning the evidence. The communication cost for sending the challenged data block of two schemes is the same. In terms of the communication cost of returning the evidence, the depth of the authentication structure of this scheme is less than [25] , but its output is 4 times that of [25] , so the sibling nodes of each node is more than [25] , and the corresponding auxiliary verification information is larger than [25] . Therefore, the communication cost of this scheme is greater than [25] .
3) DATA DYNAMICS EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
This experiment is designed to analyze and compare the data dynamic updating efficiency of this scheme and [25] . In the same experimental environment, test the time by the two schemes when tenant updates the data blocks and basic blocks in the cloud servers. The updating operation time includes the time when the cloud service provider performs the updating operation and the tenant verify the updating evidence. By comparing and analyzing the time consumed by the two schemes, the improvement of the dynamic updating operation efficiency of this scheme is verified.
1) Efficiency comparison of data blocks updating
The data block size divided in the experiment is still 50 KB, and the output of HMBT is 8. Test the time consumed when inserting and deleting data blocks are 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 3000 respectively. Finally, the average of 20 experiments is selected as the experimental result, as shown in Fig 10. From Figure 10 , it can be seen that when the number of inserting and deleting data blocks gradually increases, the time of this scheme and [25] gradually increases. However, this scheme is better than [25] . This is because the depth of authentication structure of this scheme is less than [25] , so the number of nodes that need to be updated for inserting and deleting operations is also less than [25] . In addition, compared with the deleting operation and inserting operation, there is no need to store new data and tags when deleting the data blocks, and the number of nodes that need to be updated is reduced accordingly. Therefore, the time of the deleting operation is less than inserting operation.
2) Efficiency comparison of basic blocks updating The basic block size divided in the experiment is still 1 KB, and the output of the HMBT is 8. Test the time consumed when inserting, modifying and deleting basic blocks are 500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, and 3000 respectively. Finally, the average of 20 experiments is selected as the experimental result, as shown in Figure 11 . From Figure 11 , it can be seen that when the number of inserting, modifying and deleting basic blocks gradually increases, the time of this scheme and [25] gradually increases. However, this scheme is better than [25] , and the reason is consistent with the data blocks updating. In addition, the time for inserting, modifying, and deleting basic blocks in both schemes is gradually reduced, but the difference is small. This is because the operation of the basic block does not change the number of data blocks, so it does not affect the overall structure of the HMBT, and only changes the number of basic blocks in each data block. The inserting operation increases the number of basic blocks, the modifying operation does not change the number of basic blocks, and the deleting operation will reduce the number of basic blocks, so the corresponding hash calculation required to update the value of the HMBT nodes also decreases in turn. However, the hash calculation itself is not costly, so the time difference between the three basic block operations is very small. Therefore, the time consumed by the inserting, modifying, and deleting basic blocks corresponding to the two schemes gradually decreases.
V. RELATED WORK
Cloud computing and cloud storage have become a norm in our society. Many researchers have explored and achieved remarkable results in this field. Document [36] pays attention to the problem of searchable encryption and proposed a scheme to support the dynamic multi-phrase ranked search over encrypted data. In cloud storage, secure data sharing with different users is an important functionality. A key-aggregate authentication cryptosystem was proposed in document [37] to solve this problem. As described in document [38] , Cloud computing can also be applied in the medical field, which will significantly enhance the experience of healthcare users. To ensure the safety and integrity of the data stored on the cloud servers, the data integrity auditing must be implemented periodically.
In order to reduce the verification burden on tenants, the auditing plan needs to support public auditing. The third party auditor is introduced in [16] and [18] to finish data integrity auditing, providing public and credible verification results for the tenant. However, these schemes can't provide data privacy protection, and the third party auditor or attacker could obtain the tenant's data privacy. Document [21] carefully analyzes the fine-grained data and authorization authentication of the third party auditor, and then proposed a scheme to support public auditing and dynamic data verification, which is suitable for frequent small updating operations. Document [22] solves the threat of collusion attacks. This scheme builds a public integrity auditing scheme based on vector commitment and local verification to revoke group signatures. The document [23] focuses on the data integrity verification of the third party auditor, optimizes the existing protocol to resist the malicious attacks initiated by internal personnel on the cloud storage servers, including replace attack, replay attack and forge attack, and proposes a new protocol that uses the modified Chameleon authentication tree to perform efficient block-level and fine-grained dynamic data updating operations on the data stored on the cloud. However, this scheme also presents a threat of data privacy leakage.
In order to support the dynamic operations, document [25] proposes a data integrity verification mechanism based on the authentication skip list to support dynamic data operations. The verification process uses the information of data block tags and the verification path. However, due to the need of a longer authentication path and a large number of auxiliary information, the mechanism can easily lead to too much computation cost and communication cost. MHT is widely considered to be a good storage authentication structure supporting dynamic operations. Document [26] uses the MHT to propose a data integrity verification mechanism to support dynamic operations. But using hash values of data blocks as leaf nodes of MHT, it is easy to cause large computation and communication cost during the verification process. After multiple insertions and deletions, the Merkle tree will become unbalanced, so the time spent between different blocks will vary greatly. For this purpose, document [27] improves the Merkle tree, allowing each leaf node to correspond to a continuous serial number of data blocks, which makes the dynamic operation more efficient and convenient to restore the balance of the Merkle tree. Document [22] uses the MHT to conduct detailed research on the protection and verification of cloud data.
VI. CONCLUSION
In VANETs, the vehicles can constantly collect road condition information and save it for later use and analysis, but the local storage capacity is limited. Therefore, the combination of VANETs and cloud storage will be a good choice. The vehicles, as the cloud tenants, outsource data to cloud servers. In order to ensure the integrity of the data, an effective data integrity auditing scheme is essential. This paper proposes an efficient and secure data integrity auditing scheme. The scheme constructs the HMBT authentication structure, which will not only effectively reduce the height of the authentication structure, but also enable the tenants to dynamically update data with different granularity. In data preprocessing, this scheme colors the data, preventing the third party auditor from stealing data privacy of tenants during the process of evidence verification. Finally, theoretical analysis proves that the data integrity verification scheme is safe. The results of experimental performance analysis show that, compared with document [25] , the scheme can reduce the time cost of data integrity auditing and data dynamic updating. It is insufficient that the communication cost is slightly greater than the document [25] .
